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I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a loud public outcry against noncustodial parents
who fail to pay their fair share of child support. Because the majority of
noncustodial parents are men, most of the public rage has been directed
at so called "deadbeat dads." Policymakers and politicians from both
sides of the aisle and from both federal and state levels of government
have called for tougher enforcement of child support obligations. State
governments interested in offsetting the costs of public assistance to single parent families have been particularly eager to adopt new strategies
of enforcement that promise to generate more revenues from collections
of child support obligations. And from this standpoint of generating revenues, one of the newest and most promising enforcement strategies is
revoking motor vehicle and professional licenses ("license revocation")
from delinquent obligors.'
1 Office of Child Support Enforcement, License Restriction and Revocation: A Partial
Progress Report (1996).
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Although there has been wide support for tougher child support enforcement and for license revocation in particular, concerns about the
constitutionality of this enforcement strategy have been raised. 2 Therefore, this article addresses the most likely bases for constitutional challenge of license revocation programs. Section HI provides some
historical background on child support enforcement in the United States,
including traditional judicial enforcement strategies and the modem trend
towards administrative enforcement. Section III addresses the constitutional parameters of license revocation and the most likely bases for legal
challenge which include due process (both procedural and substantive)
and equal protection claims. Section I also analyzes separately the constitutionality of motor vehicle and professional license revocation programs. Section IV examines existing legislative schemes for
implementing license revocation, and conclusions are presented in Section V.
II.

BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL APPROACH TO CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT

A.

SCOPE OF THE CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PROBLEM

A growing number and proportion of American children live in single parent homes; many of these youngsters receive little or no financial
support from their noncustodial parents. 3 Since 1970, the number of single-mother families increased by 164 percent. 4 In 1993, 1.2 million children were born out-of-wedlock in the United States. 5 These dramatic
social changes have overtaxed the state and local courts and has led to
more federal involvement in child support enforcement, which, in turn,
has placed additional demands on the judiciary to keep up with new fed6
eral requirements.
2 See, e.g., Thompson v. Ellenbecker, Civ. 94-4166 (D.S.D. filed Sept. 18, 1995). See
also Mark R. Fondacaro, License Revocation for Purposes of Child Support Enforcement:
Constitutional and Policy Implications, Paper presented at the Interstate\UIFSA-Self-Employed Conference, co-sponsored by the National Child Support Enforcement Association and
the Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (1995).

3 House Comm. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 103D CONG., lsr SEss., 1994 GREENBOOK:
BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURIsDICION OF THE Comm.

ON WAYS AND

MEANS 456 (Comm. Print. 1994) [hereinafter 1994 GREENBOOK].

4 Id.

5 U.S. DEPARTmENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVic s, PUBLIC HEAXLTH SERVICE, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS,
Monthly Vital Statistics Report (Sept. 21, 1995).
6 Traditionally, states have been sovereign in the area of family law. Article 1, Section
8 of the Constitution and the Tenth Amendment may be read together to reserve family law
matters to the states. H.R. doc. No. 19, 101st cong., 1st Sess. 11, at 55 (1989). However, the
federal funding of the AFDC program creates a nexus between family law and an area in
which Congress is authorized to act under the Enumeration of Powers Clause - spending -
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This federal/state partnership has met some success. According to
the Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement's own estimates, $2.2
billion was spent in 1993 to collect $9.0 billion in child support. 7 A
significant share of the amount collected is directly attributable to federally required income withholding from noncustodial parents' wages. Obviously, this strategy of enforcement and collection is effective only in
cases where the noncustodial parent is employed in a wage earning job.
Collecting child support from the self-employed and non-wage earners
has proven more difficult. Consequently, states are continuing to experiment with new strategies to reach these groups. One of the strategies that
has proven particularly successful in a number of states is revoking delinquent obligors' professional and motor vehicle licenses. 8 In fact, this
approach has proven so successful that proponents of welfare reform on
both sides of the political aisle have supported the adoption of a mandate
in federal welfare reform legislation requiring all states to adopt license
restriction programs. 9 But even before the recently enacted federal mandate, many states, attracted by the apparent success that license revocation programs have achieved in generating support collections, had
voluntarily adopted their own license revocation programs.' 0
thereby establishing the authority for Congress to enact laws dealing with child support
enforcement.
7 For every $1 of administrative expenses, an amount of $3.98 was collected. Also
during 1993, 553,000 paternities were established, over 1,000,000 support obligations were
established, collections were made for almost 3,000,000 cases, almost 250,000 families were
removed from AFDC because of child support collections, and 12.0 percent of AFDC payments were saved as a result of child support enforcement. 1994 GREENBOOK, supra note 3, at
455.
8 See, e.g., Ben Rand, License suspension Statute in Child Support Cases Successful in
Other States, Gannet News Service, June 2, 1995; Matthew Daily, Nation Seeks New Ways to
Combat Deadbeat Parents: State Explores License Revocation, THE HARTFORD CouRANr,
Mar. 5, 1995; Leslie Boellstorff, Maine Law a Factor in Child-Support Debate, OMAHA
WORLD HERALD, May 3, 1995; Mike Doming, License Loss a Real Threat to Deadbeats:
Maine Child-Support Plan sets Example, CIucAGo TRIBUNE, Apr. 10, 1995. The Office of
Child Support Enforcement's progress report on license revocation reports that between August 1993 and February 1996, Maine collected over $39 million in support. See supra note 1.
9 PERSONAL RESPONSmiLrrY AND WORK OPPORTUNITY REcONcILATION AcT OF 1996,
H.R. 3734, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) [hereinafter WELFARE REFORM AcT]. See also PERSONAL R.EsPONSImrrY Acr OF 1995, H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., Sec. 969 (1995); Family
Stability and Work Act of 1995, H.R. 1250, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995).
10 See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. § 32-3701, § 12-2452; ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-23-125,
§ 16-22-102, § 17-1-104; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11350.6; COLO. REv. STAT. § 26-13123, 42-2-127.5; CONN. PuB. AcTs 95-310; D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-916(e), 30-325; FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 61.13015, 409.2598, 231.097, 231.28, 322.058, 455.203, 559.79; 305 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/10-17.6; IND. CODE § 31-6-6.1-16(k), IC 31-1-11.5-130), IC 31-6-6.1-16(j), IC 9-256-19, IC 9-25-6-20, IC 25-1-1.2; IOWA CODE § 598.23A; KAN STAT. ANN. §§ 74-146,74-147,
20-1204a; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 186.570; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.30-315.35, 32:432;
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 §§ 305, 306; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A § 2459; MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 10-101, 10-119; MAss. ANN. LAWS. ch. 119A § 16; MINN. STAT.

§ 518.551 (subdivision 12); id. § 214.101; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-5-701-713; NEv. REv.
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TRADITIONAL CASE-BY-CASE SYSTEM OF ENFORCEMENT

Until the mid-1970s, single parents with custody of their children
could not rely on the federal government to assist them in their efforts to
ensure that non-custodial parents paid their fair share of child support."
In order to collect delinquent child support, custodial parents were required to initiate enforcement actions, typically in state and local courts.
The traditional tools of civil enforcement include wage garnishment,
liens against real and personal property, levy and execution, and contempt.12 These traditional remedies are administered on a case-by-case
basis and typically require that legal action be initiated by the custodial
parent. The limitations of this approach include the fact that the custodial parent must have the resources available to initiate and prevail in a
legal action before delinquent child support can be collected. Moreover,
repeated court actions may be necessary to ensure ongoing compliance
with support obligations.
The likelihood that individuals can use the courts successfully to
enforce support obligations is influenced by whether they have access to
the courts and can afford legal representation. Unfortunately, those individuals who are the most in need of support payments are usually the
least likely to have the personal, social, and financial resources to initiate
and pursue a legal action or actions. Moreover, the fact that legal actions
placed on backlogged court dockets can consume inordinate amounts of
time coupled with the frequent need for repeated legal actions means that
STAT. §§ 425.347, 425.348; N.H. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 161-B; N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 111-b

(subdivision 12); N.Y. VEH. & TRAP. LAW §§ 502, 510, 511, 530; N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§§ 244-b, 244-c; N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 6509-b, 6501, 6502; N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 440-a,
441, 441-c; N.Y. ALC. BEv. CoNT. LAW § 119; N.Y. JuD. LAW § 90; N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW

§ 3-503; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1T-142.2; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-08.1-06, 14-08.1-07; Omo

REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2301.373, 2301.374; OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56 § 240.11; OR. REv. STAT.
§§ 25.750, 25.753, 25.756, 25.771, 25.783, 25.759, 25.762, 25.765, 25.768, 25.774, 25.777,
25.780, 25.990; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4355; P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 5 § 30; R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 11-2-1, 11-2-3; S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-940; S.D. CoDrFED LAWS §§ 32-12-116, 257A-56; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 795, 798; VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 63.1-263.1; id. § 20-60.3.
See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERvICES, ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, OSCE Information Exchange

Matrix on License Revocation (August 1995) (providing a graphical summary of the features
of most state license revocation statutes) [hereinafter Matrix on License Revocation].
11 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, ESSENTIALS FOR ATroRNEYs

IN CILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT 9 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter ESSENTIALS FOR ATTORNEYS].
12 Ld.at 123. Criminal sanctions including criminal contempt and criminal non-support
also are available. Id. See also HARRY D. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA:' THE LEGAL
PERSPECTIn 53 (1981) (explaining criminal contempt in the child support context); MARGARET CAMPBELL HAYNES ET AL., CHILD SUPPORT- REFERENCE MANUAL: CmLD SUPPORT
PRoEcr V-26 (1990) (stating that "civil contempt proceedings are less complicated and more

widely used than criminal contempt proceedings").
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even those with access to the courts may have difficulty ensuring that
13
they receive an ongoing stream of child support.
As divorce rates and the number of out-of-wedlock births climbed
steadily throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the federal government became
increasingly focused on the problem of child support enforcement. 14 In
particular, the rising rates of divorce, separation, and out-of-wedlock
births placed increased demands on the public welfare system, which
was funded largely by federal tax dollars. 15 The initial efforts to federalize aspects of child support enforcement were more clearly focused on
recouping these tax dollars than on increasing the financial resources
available to single parent families. Nonetheless, the federal government
tackled the issue of child support enforcement by establishing programs
through which state agencies would use existing court-based procedures
and traditional remedies to establish and enforce child support obligations. 16 These programs had the effect of increasing caseloads in state
17
and local courts, placing even greater demands on the legal system. It
quickly became apparent to both state and federal officials that the existing court-based system of child support enforcement was ill equipped
to efficiently handle the influx of child-support cases initiated by state
agencies. Consequently, legislators began to look for expedited and administrative procedures that could efficiently process the ever increasing
number of child support claims.
C.

MODERN TRENDS TOWARDS ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT

The modern Federal oversight of child support enforcement in the
United States is rooted -in the Social Services Amendments of 1974,
which were signed into law in 1975, creating title IV-D of the Social
Security Act. 18 Under title IV-D, the Federal Office of Child Support
Enforcement ("OCSE")1 9 is responsible for overseeing the operation of
13 ESSENTIALS FOR ATroRNEYs, supra note 11, at 123. Another barrier to effective use
of the traditional enforcement mechanisms is that remedies such as wage garnishment pose
difficult problems when enforcement is directed at a self-employed obligor. AMERICAN BAR
AsSOCIATION, IMPROVING CHILD SUPPORT PRAicrIC 11-158 (Vol. I, 1986). Furthermore,
although civil contempt may be an available remedy when dealing with a self-employed obligor, many judges hesitate to use civil contempt because of the growing problem of jail overcrowding. HAYNES, supra note 12, at V-26.
14 EssENTIAzS FOR ATTORNEys, supra note 11 at 3, 9. "Divorce rates increased dramatically between 1965 and 1974, when the annual number of divorces nationwide more than
doubled to 977,000." Id. at 3.
15 "Between calendar years 1970 and 1991, total annual AFDC benefit payments increased from $4.1 billion to 20.3 billion." Id. at 4.
16 Id.
17 Id.

18 42 U.S.C. 651 et seq.
19 The OCSE is within the Administration for Children and Families, Department of
Health and Human Services.
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the Child Support Enforcement program. 20 Operational aspects of the
program were delegated to the state governments under the 1975 federal
initiative. 2 1 Each State was required to have a federally approved State
Plan indicating that the state had designated one organizational unit for
program administration and that the state will attempt to establish pater22
nity and support for AFDC recipients and other qualifying individuals.
In this effort, the state must agree to cooperate with other states and with
local courts and law enforcement officials.2 3 Furthermore, the state must
establish a parent locator service that integrates the data available
through local, state, and federal parent location resources. 24 Any support
payments must initially be made to the state, which will record collections and disbursements.2 5
The 1975 federal initiative was followed by two subsequent major
federal initiatives: one in 1984,26 the other in 1988.27 The 1984 initiative
required improvements in state, and local child support enforcement in
several areas, including mandatory practices and equalization of services
for welfare and non-welfare families. In terms of mandatory practices,
all states were required to improve their enforcement mechanisms by enacting statutes to provide for "(1) mandatory income withholding procedures; (2) expedited processes for establishing and enforcing support
orders; (3) State income tax refund interceptions; (4) liens against real
and personal property, security or bonds to assure compliance with support obligations; and (5) reports of support delinquency information to
consumer reporting agencies. ''28 Several specific requirements also
"were directed at improving State services to non-welfare families. All
of the mandatory practices must be available to both types of cases; the
interception of Federal income tax refunds was extended to non-welfare

20 Program oversight includes: "(1) establishing a parent locator service; (2) establishing
standards for State program organization, staffing, and operation to assure an effective program; (3) reviewing and approving State plans for the program; (4) evaluating State program
operations by conducting audits of each States's program; (5) certifying cases for referral to
the Federal courts to enforce support obligations; (6) certifying cases for referral to the IRS for
support collections; (7) providing technical assistance to States and assisting them with reporting procedures; (8) maintaining records of program operations, expenditures, and collections;
and (9) submitting and annual report to Congress." EssEN-rIA FOR ATroNEYs, supra note
11, at 229.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.

25 Id.

26 P.L. 98-378.
27 P.L. 100-485.
28 ESSENTIALS FOR ATroRNEys, supra note 11, at 232.
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cases; incentive payments became available for collections on non-welfare cases." 29
The enactment of the "Family Support Act of 1988" ("FSA")
marked the most recent major federal initiative in the area of child support enforcement prior to current welfare reform efforts. The FSA required immediate wage withholding in a wide range of cases, required
judges and other officials to use state child support guidelines in setting
awards in most cases, added new requirements regarding the periodic
review and modification of orders, required states to meet federal performance standards for paternity establishment, and encouraged states to
30
adopt a simple civil process for voluntary paternity acknowledgment.
The FSA also required each state to put in place an automated statewide
31
system for tracking and monitoring child support cases.
The periodic addition of new federal requirements added new burdens to the already overtaxed state court systems. In an attempt to address this problem, the FSA encouraged the use of administrative (rather
than judicial) procedures where feasible. 32 This move was consistent
with more general federal trends toward considerations of administrative
efficiency in both constitutional and administrative law. 33 The establishment of license revocation programs is a prime example of this overall
shift toward more systemic and administrative models of justice and
34
enforcement.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL PARAMETERS OF LICENSE
REVOCATION PROGRAMS

A majority of states have already enacted license revocation programs or are working toward enacting such programs. 35 As reliance on
these enforcement tools leads to more actual license revocations, it is
inevitable that constitutional challenges to such statutory schemes will be
29 Id. at 233.
30 Id. at 234-35.

Id.
Note: as a general matter, states are free to implement either judicial, administrative,
or quasi-judicial procedures to establish child support obligations. However, the requirement
31
32

that states implement "expedited processes" limits the role of the courts and increases the

necessity of reliance on administrative procedures. H.R. Doe. No. 19, 101st Cong., Ist Sess.
11, at 20 (1989).
33 See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 425 U.S. 319 (1976). See also Mark R. Fondacaro, Toward a Synthesis of Law and Social Science: Due Processand ProceduralJustice in
the Context of National Health Care Reform, 72 DENVER L. REv. 303, 307 (1995).
34 This movement toward greater reliance on administrative process often clashes with
local legal culture and the traditional emphasis on an individualized, case-by-case approach to
due process and enforcement.
35 See supra note 10.
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raised with increasing frequency in states across the country. 36 Constitutional challenges are most likely to focus on whether license revocation
programs have exceeded constitutional parameters in the areas of procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection. 37 Accordingly, each of these potential bases for constitutional challenge are
reviewed below.

A.

PROCEDURAL

DUE

PROCESS

1. Threshold ConstitutionalIssues
Under the United States Constitution, the federal and state governments are prohibited from depriving an individual of "life, liberty, or
property without due process of law."' 38 In terms of the scope of due
process protections, they are mandated by the Federal Constitution only
in cases involving government or state action.3 9 Given that license revocation laws are generally enacted by state legislatures and implemented
and enforced by the administrative and judicial arms of state government, the state action requirement is easily met. Indeed, federal welfare
reform initiatives now mandate that states adopt license restriction
programs.
The second threshold requirement which must be satisfied before
constitutional safeguards are mandated is that the government must
threaten to deprive a person of a liberty or property interest.40 In the
context of license revocation programs, the Supreme Court would need
to characterize the revocation of the relevant license (motor vehicle, professional) as an infringement on an individual's property or liberty interest. Again, this threshold requirement is easily satisfied. The United
States Supreme Court has clearly recognized the issuance of both professional 4 and motor vehicle 42 licenses as creating important property or
liberty interests requiring due process protection. Finally, if it is established that a legislative scheme involves both state action and a potential
deprivation of property or liberty, a determination is made regarding
36 Several such challenges already have been raised. See Thompson v. Ellenbecker, Civ.
94-4166 (D.S.D. filed Sept. 18, 1995); Petschen v. Governor of Minnesota, Civ. File No. 3-96115 (D. Minn. 1996).
37 See, e.g., Thompson v. Ellenbecker, Civ. 94-4166 (D.S.D. filed Sept. 18, 1995).
38 U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV.
39 The Fourteenth Amendment applies to "state action" taken by state governments, and
the Fifth Amendment applies to "government action" taken by the federal government.
40 Fondacaro, supra note 33, at 307.
41 Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979).
42 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). "Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's
case, their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the
licenses. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due
process required by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 539.
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"what process is due" in light of the particular context of the legislation
under consideration.
In determining "what process is due," the Supreme Court has developed an unusually flexible strategy. In fact, due process, perhaps more
than any other constitutional doctrine, is recognized as an evolving, flexible construct, highly dependent on context for its meaning. As noted by
Justice Frankfurter, due process is not "a technical conception with a
'4 3
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has continued to recognize the
evolving nature of due process analysis and the importance of being flexible when identifying what specific procedures satisfy requirements of
due process and fundamental fairness. 44 In the current context of the
dramatic increase in the number of claims for government services and
benefits, both the Supreme Court and administrative agencies have become more aware that resources are limited and that government programs must adopt decisionmaking procedures that strike an appropriate
balance among fairness, accuracy, and efficiency. 45
2. Administrative Review
Modem Supreme Court doctrine on due process and administrative
review is typically traced to the case of Goldberg v. Kelly, which the
United States Supreme Court decided in 1970.46 The Court in Goldberg
addressed whether the state could terminate welfare payments without
providing the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing before the depriva43 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. Mcgrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurter,

J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter characterized the flexibility of due process analysis as
follows:
Expressing as it does in its ultimate analysis respect enforced by law for that feeling
of just treatment which has been evolved through centuries of Anglo-American constitutional history and civilization, "due process" cannot be imprisoned within the
treacherous limits of any formula. Representing a profound attitude of fairness between man and man, and more particularly between the individual and government,
"due process" is compounded of history, past courses of decisions, and stout confidence in the strength of the democratic faith which we profess. Due process is not a

mechanical instrument. It is not a yard-stick. It is a process. It is a delicate process
of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of judgment by those whom the
Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the process.
Id. at 162-63.
44 See, e.g., Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) ("The very nature
of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every
imaginable situation."); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("It has been said so
often by this Court and others as not to require citation of authority that due process is flexible

and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.").
45 See generallyJerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process:Some Theoretical and LitigationNotes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness,and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CoR,NEi L. Ry. 772 (1974).
46 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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tion. In Goldberg, individuals facing termination of welfare payments
were provided with informal pre-termination review procedures. However, the pre-termination review did not include many of the traditional
procedural safeguards such as the opportunity for personal appearance,
oral presentation of evidence, or confrontation and cross-examination of
adverse witnesses. 47 Instead, individuals whose payments were termi48
nated were entitled to a post-deprivation "fair hearing."
The Court focused its analysis on whether the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a hearing before welfare benefits
can be terminated. The Court acknowledged that termination of welfare
benefits involved "state action" and characterized welfare payments as

"property" that could not be arbitrarily withdrawn by the government.
The Court noted that due process analysis requires consideration of the

extent to which a person may be "condemned to suffer grievous loss." 49
Given that welfare provides "the means to obtain essential food, clothing,
housing, and medical care," the Court viewed the termination of such

benefits as a potential "grievous loss"' 5o that clearly triggers due process
protection.

51

Addressing the question of what process is due, the Court held that
a pre-deprivation evidentiary hearing must be provided before benefits
can be terminated. 52 At the hearing, the recipient is entitled to most, but
not all, of the traditional procedural safeguards of a formal judicial trial.
For example, the recipient is entitled to receive timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for termination; an opportunity to appear personally before the decisionmaker and to present arguments and evidence
orally; an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses;
the right to retain an attorney at personal expense; a statement by the
decisionmaker indicating the reasons for the determination and the eviId. at 258-59.
The "fair hearing" involved a proceeding before an independent state hearing officer.
At the fair hearing, the recipient was entitled to appear personally, offer oral evidence, confront and cross-examine witnesses, and have a record made of the hearing. If the recipient
prevailed, he or she was paid all funds erroneously withheld. A recipient whose aid was not
restored by a fair hearing decision was entitled to judicial review. Id. at 259-60.
49 Id. at 263-64.
50 In his concurring opinion iri Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. Mcgrath, Justice Frankfurter stated "that the right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any
kind... is a principle basic to our society." 341 U.S. at 168.
51 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264 (stating "that termination of aid pending resolution of a
controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to
live while he waits"). The Court focused narrowly on the welfare context, acknowledging the
basic considerations of survival at issue. The Court indicated that for "virtually anyone else
whose governmental entitlement are ended," such issues of basic survival are not a factor. The
Court also recognized the potential demoralization costs associated with the erroneous termination of welfare benefits. Id.at 265. Note: Such demoralization costs also may result from
overly aggressive child support enforcement.
52 Id. at 261.
47
48
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dence relied upon; and review by an impartial decisionmaker who was
not involved in making the decision under review.5 3 The Court concluded that "[t]he opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capaci54
ties and circumstances of those who are to be heard."
Following Goldberg, there was a noted tendency by the courts "to
judicialize administrative procedures." 55 Around that time, Judge Henry
Friendly wrote an influential article that was sharply critical of what
some commentators characterized as a due process explosion. Judge
Friendly felt that the Supreme Court in particular had "yielded too readily to the notions that the adversary system is the only appropriate
model" and had "been too prone to indulge in constitutional codification."'56 As an alternative, he encouraged experimentation with investigative models of factfinding and dispute resolution. 57
Outside the welfare context, the Supreme Court has more recently
applied the balancing test articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge5 8 when addressing the issue of "what process is due."
In Mathews the Court held that disability benefits, unlike welfare
benefits, could be terminated without a prior trial-like evidentiary hearing provided that the following three distinct factors are considered:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute pro59
cedural requirement would entail.
The Supreme Court has since applied the Mathews balancing test to
a wide range of contexts. 60 In each case, the particular procedural safe53 Id. at 267-71.

54 Id. at 268-69. Thus, due process required an oral hearing because the Court considered written submissions to be
an unrealistic option for most recipients, who lack the educational attainment necessary to write effectively and who cannot obtain professional assistance. Moreover,
written submissions do not afford the flexibility of oral presentations; they do not
permit the recipient to mold his argument to the issues the decision maker appears to
regard as important.

Id. at 269.
55 See Henry J.Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1268-69
(1975);
56
57
58

JERRY L. MASHAw, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 8-9 (1985).
Id. at 1316.
Id.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 425 U.S. 319 (1976).

59 Id. at 335.
60 See, e.g., DAvIs & PIERCE, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 53 (1994).
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guards required are tailored to the specific context under consideration.
In Mathews, the Court held that the opportunity for written presentation
prior to the termination of benefits, coupled with the opportunity for a
post-termination evidentiary hearing and judicial review, satisfied the re61
quirements of due process.
In the specific context of motor vehicle license suspension, the
Supreme Court in Bell v. Burson held that pre-deprivation hearings were
required for cases in which uninsured motorists involved in accidents
were subject to license suspension. 62 In Bell, which was decided after
Goldbergbut before Mathews, the Court held that "licenses are not to be
taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment." 63 Notwithstanding the government's claim that a
hearing on liability was not needed "because fault and liability [were]
irrelevant to the statutory scheme," the Court required a limited pre-deprivation inquiry to determine whether there was "a reasonable possibility
of judgments in the amounts claimed being rendered against the
licenses."6
However, subsequent cases in other contexts have indicated that
even when such pre-deprivation procedures are required, they need not
always be formal to satisfy constitutional requirements. For example, the
Supreme Court indicated in Goss v.Lopez that informal, flexible, predeprivation procedures may satisfy due process requirements. 65 In Goss,
the Court held that high school students facing a ten day suspension are
entitled to an informal hearing and that generally the hearing should take
place before the student is removed from school. 6 6 Note that this predeprivation "opportunity to be heard" can be informal and need not encompass formal process features such as the opportunity to secure counsel, to cross-examine adverse witnesses, or to call witnesses to support
67
one's version of the facts.
Overall, the Supreme Court has operationalized the "opportunity to
be heard" along a continuum that ranges from the highly formal in the
welfare context 6s to the highly informal in the context of school suspension.69 Outside of the welfare context, constitutional standards of procedural due process increasingly require the balancing of factors associated
61 Mathews, 425 U.S. at 349. Some commentators have suggested that post-termination
trial-type hearings are very costly and unnecessary after adequate pre-termination hearings
have been provided. See, e.g., DAvis AND PIERCE, supra note 60, at 19.
62 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
63 Ld.
at 539.
64 Id.
65 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
66 Id. at 582.
67 Id. at 583.
68 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267-71.
69 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583-84 (1975).
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with fair and accurate decisionmaking against the government interest in
conserving administrative and fiscal resources.
3.

Models of Administrative Justice

In his book entitled BureaucraticJustice, Mashaw outlines several
models of due process and bureaucratic justice. Two have particular relevance to developing a procedural framework that can guide the administrative review of decisions to revoke motor vehicle and professional
licenses: (1) moral judgment; and (2) bureaucratic rationality. 70 According to Mashaw, the "justice" of an administrative decision is evaluated in
terms of "those qualities of a decision process that provide arguments for
the acceptability of its decision." 71 For example, within a moral judgment framework, the fairness and acceptability of decisions are assessed
in light of traditional trial-like processes for determining individual entitlement. From the standpoint of bureaucratic rationality, justice results
when decisions are accurate and efficient realizations of the legislative
will.7 2

The moral judgment model is most similar to civil or criminal trials
and is concerned primarily with the ability of individuals to assert their
rights to resources. 73 The process involves individualized determinations
of winners and losers in the context of conflicting and competing interests. Mashaw believes:
[t]his entitlement-awarding goal of the moral judgment
model gives an obvious and distinctive cast to the basic
issue of adjudicatory resolution. The issue is the deservingness of some or all of the parties in the context of
certain events, transactions, or relationships that give
rise to a claim ... [T]he "justice" in this model inheres
in its promise of a full and equal opportunity to obtain
one's entitlement. 74
The value of this approach is "fairness"; the primary goal is conflict
resolution. 75
The bureaucratic model, on the other hand, emphasizes accuracy
and cost-effectiveness of claims processing. According to Mashaw:
A system focused on correctness defines the questions
presented to it by implementing decisions in essentially
70 JERRY

23-25 (1983).
71 Id. at
72 1& at
73 Id. at
74 Id. at
75 Id.

L. MASHAW,
24-25.

25.
21.

30-31.
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factual and technocratic terms. Individual adjudicators
must be concerned about the facts in the real world that
relate to the truth or falsity of the [claim]. At a managerial level the question becomes technocratic: What is the
least-cost methodology for collecting and combining
those facts about claims that will reveal the proper decision. To illustrate by contrast, this model would exclude
questions of value or preference as obviously irrelevant
to the administrative task, and it would view reliance on
nonreplicable, nonreviewable judgment or intuition as a
singularly unattractive methodology for decision. The
legislature should have previously decided the value
questions . . . . From the perspective of bureaucratic
rationality, administrative justice is accurate decisionmaking carried on through processes appropriately ratio76
nalized to take account of costs.
Obviously, the values of the bureaucratic model are accuracy and efficiency; the primary goal is program implementation.
Increasingly, traditional adversary procedures rooted in the moral
judgment model have been criticized for providing excessive opportunities for obfuscation and delay and for their high costs. The result has
been more judicial acceptance of positive case management as a legitimate strategy for achieving fair, accurate, and cost-effective results. In
effect, there has been a shift in focus from passive judicial reliance on
adversary processes toward more positive judicial management of adjudication. 77 As a result, due process analysis has become more concerned
with systemic effects rather than individual injustices and has taken on a
managerial orientation that is more consistent with a bureaucratic model
of justice. 78 This shift towards a bureaucratic model of justice does not
necessarily eliminate the need for more traditional procedural protection
given that management practices are directed at solving systemic
problems rather than correcting individual decisions.7 9 Presumably,
however, the need and demand for individualized appeals and judicial
review will be reduced if more accurate, timely, and efficient decisions
are made.
76 Id. at 25-26.

77 See Mashaw, supra note 45, at 779.
78 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and
ConstitutionalRemedies, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 309, 373 (1993). This modem focus on systemic

issues is reflected in the Supreme Court's analysis in Mathews: "procedural due process rules
are shaped by the risk error of inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality
of cases, not the rare exceptions." Mathews, 425 U.S. at 344.
79 Mashaw, supra note 45, at 804.

370

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 5:355

4. Judicial Review and Enforcement
Despite modem trends toward greater reliance on administrative enforcement and bureaucratic models of justice, courts still perform at least
three essential functions in carrying out their rights-enforcing role:
(1) a "blocking function," blocking illegal, often grossly
illegal agency actions or refusals to act; (2) an "unmasking function," forcing into political daylight the gap
between statutory standards and agency structure and
performance, and (3) a "rationality function," requiring
agencies to articulate their policies and explain them in
relation to goals. 80
Overall, judicial review serves as an important check on the exercise of
authority by program administrators 81 and may contribute to public perceptions that justice has been done.
In the context of child support, there is the question of what, if any,
level of judicial review is necessary8 2 or desirable. The answer here may
depend in part on the nature and structure of the administrative review
process established to review claims that licenses have been unjustly revoked. The need and demand for more costly judicial review is likely to
decline to the extent that effective administrative review procedures are
placed between claimants and the courts, thereby insuring that fair and
accurate decisions are made in a cost effective manner. "If a legally and
publicly acceptable system is established, then the courts will serve their
function primarily by overseeing the integrity of the system. If an adequate system is not established, then more judicial scrutiny will be required by law and demanded by the public."'83 Such increased demands
could overwhelm judicial resources, particularly regarding the review of
licenses subject to revocation through automated matching procedures.

B.

SUBSTANTIVE

DUE

PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION

1. FederalSubstantive Due Process Doctrine
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that "no state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." 84 In addition to providing the explicit procedural protections outlined in the preceding section, the Amendment has
80 See Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Courts, Health Care Reform, and the Reconstruction of
American Social Legislation, 18 J. HEALTH PoLrrIcs, POL'Y & L. 439, 443 (1993) (citations
omitted).
81 Id.
82 See infra section IV.D.
83 Fondacaro, supra note 33, at 324-25.
84 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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been interpreted as providing certain substantive protections.8 5 That is,
the Court has sometimes interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as
meaning that "deprivations of life, liberty, or property [must] be substantively reasonable. '8 6 The Court's early substantive due process cases
typically involved state economic regulations that the Court found interfered with certain fundamental "liberties" or freedoms. The early cases
focused on such economic liberties as the freedom to contract and to own
property.8 7 In an effort to protect these economic liberties, from the late
1800s until the 1930s - the infamous Lochner era88 - the Court sporadically relied on substantive due process doctrine to strike down economic and social welfare legislation such as minimum wage laws8 9 and
maximum hour laws. 90
However, with the rise of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal programs,
American society experienced a political and philosophical shift away
from recognition of economic rights as fundamental liberties and toward
an increased emphasis on the need for government involvement in economic and social affairs. 9 1 Nebbia v. New York, 92 decided prior to the
New Deal, is often cited as marking the Court's initial movement away
from the Lochner era. In Nebbia, the Court upheld a state regulation on
milk prices, reasoning that states are free "to adopt whatever economic
policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. ' 93 The Court explicitly retained the requirement that the means of state legislation "have
94
a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained."
However, as later caselaw developed, the Court abandoned even the sub85 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897).
86 Russell W. Galloway, Basic Substantive Due ProcessAnalysis, 26 U.S.F. L. REv. 625,
625 (1992).
87 See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236
U.S. 1 (1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897).
88 Named for Lochner v. New York, in which the Court struck down New York legislation that limited bakery working hours to ten hours per day and sixty hours per week. 198
U.S. 45 (1905). This period of constitutional history has become infamous because the Court
struck down many statutes geared toward improving work conditions that were, under modem
standards, deplorable. However, as noted by Nowak and Rotunda, it is important to stress that
this "position resulted from [the Justice's] independent reading of the Constitution and the
historic economic freedom of action in American life rather than from some arbitrary desire to
protect big business." JOHN E. NOWAK AND RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CoNsTrrrtrIoNAL LAW

§ 11.3, at 376 (5th ed. 1995).
89 Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
90 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
91 See Michael . Phillips, Another Look at Economic Substantive Due Process, 1987
Wisc. L. REv. 265 (1987).
92 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
93 Id. at 537.
94 Id. at 511.
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stantial relation requirement, finding economic regulatory legislation
constitutional if even a hypothetical reasonable relationship existed
95
which the legislature "might have" considered.
In sum, the Supreme Court largely reversed its substantive due process jurisprudence by refusing to recognize economic rights as liberties
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 96 Now, the Court's jurisprudence is characterized by a hesitance to meaningfully scrutinize state
economic or social welfare legislation for violations of substantive due
process. 9 7 In the case of economic regulations, the Court has completely
abandoned the use of the substantive due process doctrine to strike down
statutes that a "majority of the Court believed to be economically unwise." 9 8 As long as an economic regulation falls within the state's police
power, only a minimally rational relation between the means and ends is
required. 99 Similarly, the highly deferential mere rationality standard of
review is applied to social welfare legislation, assuming the legislation
does not infringe upon a constitutional right that the Court currently
deems to be "fundamental." 10 0 In the context of revoking licenses to
enforce child support obligations, revocation statutes will be reviewed
under a mere rationality standard unless a litigant can convince the court
that the statute infringes upon a fundamental right.101
In stark contrast to the modem Court's abdication of substantive due
process review of most economic and social welfare legislation through
the application of the rationality standard, the modem Court has become
more willing to strictly scrutinize legislation infringing upon "fundamental" non-economic rights. 10 2 The critical step in the Court's substantive
due process analysis of non-economic legislation is the initial determination of whether a right is fundamental. 103 If the Court determines that a
particular right is not a fundamental right, a state's infringement upon
that right will be subject to a highly deferential rationality standard of
review. 1°4 "Although the Supreme court has never totally rejected a ju95 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
96 LAURENCE A. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8-7, at 582 (1992).

97 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 88 § 11.4, at 383.

98 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963). The Court has not struck down an
economic regulation for violating substantive due process since 1937. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITtONAL LAW 472 (1 lth ed. 1985).

99 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
100 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
101 See, e.g., Thompson v. Ellenbecker, Civ. 94-4166 (D.S.D. filed Sept. 18, 1995); Pet-

schen v. Governor of Minnesota, Civ. File No. 3-96-115 (D. Minn. 1996).
102 The most notable examples are the privacy cases. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut,
281 U.S. 479 (1965).
103 Phillips, supra note 91, at 285-86.
104 See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474-78 (1977) (applying the rational basis test
after concluding that a woman did not have a fundamental right to an abortion); Thompson v.
Ellenbecker, Civ. 94-4166 (D.S.D. filed Sept. 18, 1995) (finding that the revocation of a driv-
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dicial role in the review of economic and social welfare legislation, it is
rare that any law or classification would be held to violate substantive
10 5
due process ...under the rationality standard."'
However, if the Court determines that a particular right is fundamental, a state's infringement upon that right will be subject to the two
tier strict scrutiny standard of review.' 0 6 Under strict scrutiny, there
must first exist a compelling state interest for infringing upon the
right. 10 7 Second, the statute must be narrowly tailored such that the
means employed by the state are necessary to reach the compelling objective. 0 8 Statutes rarely survive this strict scrutiny standard of review.
Those rights that the Court has found to be fundamental in the context of
substantive due process are typically associated with familial relations, 10 9
child-rearing, 110 and other rights that may fall under the general category
of privacy.'
Rights outside the scope of privacy and familial relations,
such as the right to operate a motor vehicle or the right to engage in
one's occupation, have not been classified as fundamental, despite their
essential role in human existence. In the context of license revocation
for the purpose of child support enforcement, this means that strict scrutiny would be applied if (1) the license revocation statute can be characterized as infringing upon familial relations or some other recognized
fundamental right, or (2) the Court recognizes a new category of fundamental rights such as a fundamental right to drive or a fundamental right
to livelihood.
2. Federal Equal ProtectionDoctrine
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "no state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." 1 2 This clause prohibits some legisla113
tive classifications that fail to treat similarly situated persons similarly.
ers license for the purpose of child support enforcement did not infringe upon a fundamental
right and consequently applying the rational basis test).
105 NowAK & ROTuNDA, supra note 88 § 11.4, at 389.
106 Id. at 384, 399.
107 kd at 384.
108 Id.
109 Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). When striking down a zoning ordi-

nance which allowed only members of a single nuclear family to live together, the Court
subjected the statute to a high level of scrutiny because the members of a non-nuclear family,
like members of a nuclear family, have a liberty interest in the right to live together.
110 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 286 U.S. 510 (1925) (in striking down a statute requiring
children to attend public schools and thus preventing them from attending private religious
schools the Court relied upon the "liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control").
111 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
112 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
113 NOwAK & RoTuNDA, supra note 88 § 14.2, at 597.
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The Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence runs a close parallel
to the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence.1 14 For example,
legislative classifications will be reviewed under a "mere rationality"
standard unless the classification is found to effect a fundamental right or
create a suspect classification.1 15 And most economic and social welfare
legislative classifications will not be found to infringe upon a fundamental right or to create a suspect classification.
Like substantive due process analysis, the mere rationality standard
of review for equal protection provides that a legislative classification
must have a legitimate legislative objective and the classification must
bear a rational relation between that objective and the means toward that
objective.11 6 Most legislative classifications will pass a test of mere rationality; 117 however, unlike substantive due process analysis, the
Supreme Court has occasionally" i8 struck down legislative classifications
under what it has suggested to be the rational basis test. 119 However,
commentators have noted that some such cases,' 20 although they appear
to involve the application of equal protection analysis, are "controlled by
other constitutional provisions."' 121 Furthermore, such cases typically do
not address "solely economic regulation or distribution of government
22
benefits."
Under equal protection analysis, the Court will also subject legislation to strict scrutiny when a legislative classification is found to be suspect. 123 For the purposes of equal protection, a suspect classification is a
classification based on race, national origin, or ethnicity. 124 Such classifications are presumptively unconstitutional.' 25 Establishing the consti114 Id. § 14.1, at 596.
115 Id. § 14.3, at 601.
116 Id.

117 TRIBE, supra note 96, at 1442 ("the rationality requirement [is] largely equivalent to a
strong presumption of constitutionality.").
118 See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 442 (1982); Allegheny Pittsburgh
Coal Co. v. Webster County, 488 U.S. 336 (1989); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. V. Ward, 470
U.S. 869 (1985); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
119 TRIBE, supra note 96, at 1444.

120 See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 442 (1982); Zobel v. Williams,
457 U.S. 55 (1982).
121 See COHEN & VARAT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONsTrrunoNAL LAW 698 (1993).

See also Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV.537 (1982).
122 Cohen and Varat point to Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), City of Cleburne v.

Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982), and
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) as examples of cases invalidating

statutes under a rational basis test that involved prejudice against particular groups as much as
they involved economic regulation or distribution of government benefits. COHEN & VARAT,
supra note 121, at 699.
123 TRIBE, supra note 96, at 1451.
124 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 88, at 637.
125 TRIBE, supra note 96, at 1466.
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tutionality of a suspect classification requires showing that the
classification is necessary to further a compelling state interest. 126 A
statutory classification will almost never withstand this level of scrutiny. 127 However, it is highly unlikely that typical license revocation
statutes could be convincingly characterized as creating classifications
based upon race or national origin.
128
The Court recognizes some classifications as quasi-suspect.

However, unlike suspect classifications, establishing the constitutionality
of a quasi-suspect classification requires only the showing that the classi-

fication is substantially related to an important state interest. 129 Thus, the
Court applies an intermediate level of scrutiny to quasi-suspect classifi-

cations - stricter than the rational basis test, but not as strict as strict
scrutiny. 130 Quasi-suspect classifications have included classifications
based upon such characteristics as gender13 1 and illegitimacy.1 3 2 Again,
it is unlikely that license revocation statutes could reasonably be characterized as creating such classifications.
Just as the Court will subject a legislative enactment to strict scrutiny when a legislative classification is found to be suspect, the Court
will also subject legislation to strict scrutiny when a legislative classifica-

tion is found to interfere with a fundamental right. 133 For the purposes of
equal protection, fundamental rights are those rights explicitly guaranteed by another constitutional provision, 34 as well as those rights that
135
the Court has deemed to be implicitly protected by the Constitution.
In the context of equal protection, rights explicitly found to be fundamental have included the right to vote, 36 the right to marry, 137 the right
126 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 88 § 14.5, at 637.
127 A notable exception is Korenatsu v. UnitedStates, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), in which the
Court upheld a military order restricting the liberty of Japanese persons. Recently, in Adarand
Constructorsv. Pena, the Court stated that they "wish~ed] to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."' 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995).
128 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (women); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456
(1988) (illegitimacy).
129 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 88 § 14.3, at 603.
130 Id.
131 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
132 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
133 TRIBE, supra note 96, at 1454.
134 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 88 § 11.7, at 399.
135 Id. This approach has been harshly criticized by proponents of original understanding
such as Robert Bork, who has characterized this aspect of equal protection jurisprudence as
"substantive equal protection." See ROBERT BORK, Tim TEMPTrNG OF AmERiCA 64 (1990).
136 NOwAK & ROTuNDA, supra note 88 § 14.31, at 866.
137 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (striking down a statute restricting remarriage by a parent who was under court order to support a minor child not in his custody).
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to use the courts, 138 or the right to travel between states. 139 In the context of child support enforcement, a plausible argument can be made that
license revocation statutes infringe upon a fundamental right for the purposes of equal protection, such as the right to travel between states.
However, such an argument is unlikely to convince either state or federal
courts that a license revocation statute is unconstitutional.
3.

State vs. Federal ConstitutionalInterpretation

Generally, a state court may interpret its state constitution as providing its citizens with more, but not less, constitutional protection than the
United States Constitution. 140 For example, a state court may strike
down a state statute for a violation of state equal protection doctrine even
though the state's interpretation of its own equal protection clause is
more expansive than the Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal
equal protection clause.141 In such a case, the state constitutional provision will be regarded as an adequate and independent ground for judicial
review. 142 Furthermore, as long as such a decision is based upon, and
expressly held to be based upon, adequate and independent state grounds,
143
the decision is final and may not be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
Clearly, the doctrine of adequate and independent state grounds has major implications for an analysis of the constitutionality of license revocation programs. Currently, such programs are based upon state
legislation. 144 Furthermore, although federal law now mandates such
programs, 145 the specifics of implementing license restriction programs
will continue to be based upon state law.' 4 6 Consequently, challenges to
138 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).

139 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 902;
Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). It is important to note that the

Court has interpreted the "right to travel" to mean exclusively the "right of free interstate
migration." Soto-Lopez, 470 U.S. at 902. For an argument that "a fundamental right to intrastate travel must exist as a logical and inevitable extension of the interstate travel doctrine,"
see Andrew C. Porter, Comment: Toward a ConstitutionalAnalysis of the Right to Intrastate
Travel, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 820 (1992).
140 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protectionof IndividualRights, 90
HA.v. L. Rav. 489, 491 (1977); J. Skelly Wright, Commentary, In Praiseof State Courts:
Confessions of a Federal Judge, I1HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 188 (1984).
141 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 88 § 2.13, at 92-93.
142 Id.

143 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) ("If the state court decision indicates clearly
and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent
grounds, we of course, will not undertake to review the decision."). See also Herv v. Pitcairn,
324 U.S. 117 (1945) ("if the same judgment would be rendered by the state court after we
corrected its views of federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory
opinion.").
144 See supra note 10.
145 See supra note 9.
146 Id.
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the constitutionality of such programs may be properly brought in state
court, and litigants will likely base their challenge on both state and fed-

eral constitutional grounds. State courts considering the constitutionality
of such programs would therefore have the authority to strike down the
state statutes that implement the program based on state constitutional
interpretation, independent of federal constitutional concerns. 147 As long
as the state has never previously held the provision of their state constitution in question to hold essentially the same meaning as the federal Constitution's parallel provision and as long as the state constitutional

doctrine provides more but not less individual protection than the federal
constitution, such a decision may not be reviewed by the United States
148
Supreme Court.

Although state and federal interpretations of parallel constitutional
provisions are often nearly indistinguishable, 149 this is not always the
case.1 50 For example, federal courts have largely abandoned the applica-

tion of substantive due process except in cases of infringement upon fundamental rights, while substantive due process remains alive in some
state courts. 151 Several state courts have, in recent years, found state
statutes unconstitutional for violations of state substantive due process
doctrine without any showing of an infringement upon a fundamental
right.152 Unfortunately, navigating the contours of such state constitutional law is a difficult task; modem state constitutional law has been
aptly characterized as "a vast wasteland of confusing, conflicting, and
essentially unintelligible pronouncements."' 153 Seldom is it clear when a
state supreme court will interpret their state constitution in a manner that
provides their citizens with more protection than is provided under federal interpretations of parallel provisions. 154
147 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 88 § 2.13,
at 92-93.
148 Id. See also COHEN & VARAT, supra note 121, at 52 ("a state court decision invalidating a state law on both state and federal constitutional grounds cannot be reviewed by the
Supreme Court, even if the bulk of the state court's discussion concerned the United States
Constitution."). However, "reliance on the state constitution will not preclude Supreme Court
review.., if the state's constitution has been construed to adopt the United States Supreme
Court's construction of the United States constitution." Id. at 52 n.1. See also Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
149 James A. Gardner, The FailedDiscourseof State Constitutionalism,90 Micu. L. REv.
761, 788 (1992).
150 Id. at 794-95.
151 Developments in the Law - The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95
HARv. L. Rv. 1463 (1982). See also G. GUNTHER, CONSTrrtUTONAL LAw 472 n.1 (lth ed.
1985).
152 Ohio v. Gowdy, 639 N.E.2d 878 (1994); People v. Linder, 535 N.E.2d 829 (1989).
153 Gardner, supra note 149, at 763.
154 Id. at 792-93.
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In a recent Massachusetts case, 155 for example, the plaintiffs noted
that their state supreme court had interpreted their state constitution as
providing, under some circumstances, a higher level of substantive due
process protection than is provided by the federal Constitution. Based on
this information, the plaintiffs argued that their state court was bound by
precedent to provide a higher level of substantive due process protection
under the particular circumstances of their case. 156 Although the Massachusetts Supreme Court agreed that Massachusetts courts "have occasionally been less willing than the Federal courts to ascribe to the
Legislature speculative and implausible ends, or to find rational the
nexus said to exist between a plausible end and the chosen statutory
means," 157 the court rejected the Plaintiffs' argument. The court stated
that they will strike down legislation that does not infringe upon a fundamental right only when the statute has "little or no perceptible relation to
the discernible public good." 158 However, when any such relationship
does exist, "any difference between the two constitutional standards
[governing due process] .. .is narrow."'1 59 In the Plaintiffs' case, the
court found that such a relationship existed.
Thus, it appears that, at least in Massachusetts, the difference in the
level of substantive due process protection afforded by the state and federal constitutions is perceptible only in cases in which no fundamental
right has been infringed and the legislation bears absolutely no rational
relation to a reasonable state interest. In such cases, the U.S. Supreme
Court may stretch to find a rational relationship where the state court will
not. In cases in which at least a plausible argument can be made that a
statute bears a rational relationship to a reasonable state interest, the state
substantive due process doctrine will run a close parallel to federal
courts' application of the same doctrine. That is, both the state court or
federal court would be likely to accept any plausible argument that the
rational relationship exists. This distinction does not go far in providing
a workable rule to determine when state and federal interpretations of
parallel constitutional provisions will be identical. Furthermore, it is not
clear that the Massachusetts approach, like that of many other states, is
principled. Rather, it seems more likely that state courts provide more
substantive due process protection when doing so leads to a result that
the state judges simply prefer. 160
155 Rushworth v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 596 N.E.2d 340 (Mass. 1992).
156 Id. at 343.

157 Id. (quoting Blue Hills Cemetery, Inc. v. Board of Registration in Embalming & Funeral Directing, 379 Mass. 368, 373 n.8 (1979)).
158 Id.

159 Id. (quoting Blue Hills Cemetery, Inc. v. Board of Registration in Embalming & Funeral Directing).
160

Gardner, supra note 149, at 792-93.
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Our following analysis of the constitutionality of license revocation
programs is based primarily on the perspective of federal constitutional
discourse; however, the arguments we present are equally applicable
under most state constitutional law and may be met in state courts with a
more or possibly less welcome reception than they would in federal
court. Where appropriate, we discuss important deviations from the federal approach that may arise in some state courts. We do not attempt to
provide an individualized state by state analysis.
4.

Substantive Due Process and Equal ProtectionAnalysis of
Motor Vehicle License Revocation

a.

Is there a fundamental right to drive?

Certainly, driving has become a simple fact of life for most Americans. Over 170 million Americans have drivers licenses 16 1 and over 84
million drive and from their place of employment alone in their vehicle. 162 The continuing, or at least perceived, lack of adequate or convenient public transportation in many cities and in most rural areas makes
operation of a motor vehicle a necessity for many, if not most, working
Americans. Indeed, without the ability to drive, many Americans would
be forced to either relocate, switch employers, or switch careers altogether. Yet, despite the essential nature of driving in American society,
it remains unclear how much courts will protect the right to drive. Historically, state courts have recognized driving as a state-granted privilege
rather than a right. 16 3 More recently, in Bell v. Burson the Supreme
Court recognized that a drivers license, once issued, is an important
property interest of the licensee, revocation of which requires procedural
due process. 164 However, driving has not been held to be a fundamental
or even an important right for the purposes of substantive due process or
equal protection.
Determining what characteristics distinguish an important right
from a fundamental right is a difficult task. 165 It has been suggested that
fundamental rights are those rights that historically have been considered
161 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES

(114 ed., 1994).
162 Id. at 627.
163 See, e.g., Hadden v. Aitken, 55 N.W.2d 620, 623 (1952).
164 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
165 Nowak and Rotunda suggest that
little... can be said to accurately describe the nature of a fundamental right, because
fundamental rights analysis is simply no more than the modem recognition of the
natural law concepts first espoused by Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull. Despite
claims to the contrary, there has never been a period of time wherein the Court did
not actively enforce values which a majority of the Justices felt were essential in our
society even though they had no specific textual basis in the Constitution.
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 88 § 11.7, at 399.
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beyond the reach of government. 166 However, as pointed out by Professor Laurence Tribe, an historical approach seems to come up short of
16 7
providing clear guidance as to what constitutes a fundamental right.
One approach often taken to identify fundamental rights is simply to list
those rights that have previously been held by the Supreme Court to be
fundamental. 68 Although sound as a matter of law, this approach leaves
something to be desired as a matter of constitutional jurisprudence. In a
dissent, Justice Harlan suggested that the liberty protected under substantive due process doctrine
is not a series of isolated points ....
It is a rational
continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom
from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints... and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain
interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state
169
needs asserted to justify their abridgment.
Either an historical analysis or an examination of Supreme Court
precedent seem to lead to the conclusion that the right to drive is unlikely
to be recognized by the Supreme Court as fundamental. Although driving is of critical importance to our modem economic structure, driving is
not an activity, or even the kind of activity, that historically has been
beyond the reach of government. The operation of the automobile has
been regulated by the state nearly since its invention. 170 Additionally,
driving is not in the list of rights previously held by the Court to be
fundamental. To date, the Supreme Court has not ruled on the question
of whether revocation of a drivers license may implicate important or
perhaps fundamental rights for the purpose of other constitutional protections such as substantive due process and equal protection. Additionally,
several state courts have explicitly held that drivers license revocation
does not infringe upon a fundamental right. 17 1 Furthermore, in the context of license revocation for the purpose of child support enforcement, a
South Dakota district court applied the rational basis test when consider166 Id. § 11.7, at 399.
167 LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MIcHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONsTrrurION (1991).

168 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 88 § 11.7, at 401.
169 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See TRIBE & DORF,
supra note 167, at 76-80.

170 For example, a 1911 Nebraska statute made it a misdemeanor for "any person under
sixteen years of age or for an intoxicated person to operate a motor vehicle." 1911 Neb. Laws
398, 400 (Chapter 115, § 6).
171 See, e.g., Linder. Consequently, state courts have found that the rational basis test is
the appropriate standard of review for examining license revocation statutes for violations of
substantive due process. See, e.g., Quiller v. Bowman, 425 S.E.2d 641 (Ga. 1993); Lite v.

Florida, 617 So. 2d 1058 (1993).
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ing a claim that a license revocation statute violated the plaintiffs' sub172
stantive due process rights.
At first blush, it seems that revocation of a drivers license may implicate the "right to travel," which has been held to be fundamental for
the purposes of equal protection. 173 However, both the textual origin and
the scope of the right to travel are unclear. 174 The so called "right to
travel" has been limited to "free interstate migration"'175 and has not in176
cluded a general right to uninhibited transportation within a state.
Those statutory provisions that most often have been found to infringe
upon the right to interstate travel are statutes that deny economic or social benefits to new state residents. 177 Such statutes clearly have the effect of deterring interstate migration. In contrast, license revocation
statutes do not have a substantial effect on deterring interstate migration.
Buses, plains, trains, taxis, etc. provide ways of transporting a person
from one state to another without requiring the person to operate a motor
vehicle.
In sum, the right to drive has not been historically beyond the reach
of government; it has not previously been held by the Supreme Court to
be a fundamental right; and it is not inextricable from the constitutional
right to travel. Accordingly, it is clear that there is now no fundamental
right to drive, and it seems, unlikely that such a right will emerge in the
constitutional jurisprudence of the Supreme Court or of any state courts
at any time in the near future.
b.

Is there a rational relationship between driving and child
support?

Even if there is no fundamental right to operate a motor vehicle,
there still exists the question of whether license revocation for an offense
unrelated to operation of a motor vehicle is rationally related to a reasonable state interest for the purposes of substantive due process and equal
protection. Under the modern rational basis test, all that is required is that
license revocation bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state interest. 17 8 The Supreme Court will refuse to strike down a statute under
this test if the rational relationship is even a hypothetical one that the
172 Thompson v. Ellenbecker, Civ. 94-4166 (D.S.D. filed Sept. 18, 1995). See also Petschen v. Governor of Minnesota, Civ. File No. 3-96-115 (D. Minn. 1996).
173 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
174 56 COLUM. L. REV. 47 (1956).
175 Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 902
176 For an argument that "a fundamental right to intrastate travel must exist as a logical an
inevitable extension of the interstate travel doctrine," see Andrew C. Porter, Comment: Toward a Constitutional Analysis of the Right to Intrastate Travel, 86 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 820
(1992).
177 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
178 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 88 § 14.3, at 601.
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legislature might have considered. 179 In the case of license revocation,
one such hypothetical and/or actual relationship is the potential deterrence that the threat of license revocation has on noncompliance with
child support obligations. States that have enacted license revocation
statutes to enforce child support obligations have seen an increase in
child support collections. 18 0 It is likely that the deterrent effect of license
revocation on noncompliance would be a sufficient justification under
federal constitutional interpretation.
However, in considering the nexus required between means and
ends to meet the rational basis test, the distinction between federal and
state constitutional interpretation can become an all important factor.
Although in the face of substantive due process challenges state courts
have often upheld license revocation statutes that punish conduct unrelated to the operation of a motor vehicle, 18' notable exceptions to this
trend do exist. For example, in People v. Linder,18 2 the Supreme Court
of Illinois found that an Illinois statute requiring the revocation of the
drivers licenses of criminal sex offenders violated the due process
clauses of both the Illinois and United States Constitutions. 183 The court
found that the defendant's interest in a drivers license was not a fundamental right and that, consequently, the "rational-basis test" was the appropriate standard of review. 184 The Linder court applied a two part test
- (1) the "legislative enactment must bear a reasonable relationship to
the public interest intended to be protected,"' 185 and (2) "the means
adopted must be a reasonable method of accomplishing the desired objective."' 86 The court determined that the purpose of the statute, as set
forth in the statute itself, was to ensure the "safe operation of motor vehicles"' 187 and that the statute did not promote a reasonable means of accomplishing that objective. 88

Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
180 See supra note 1. See also Ben Rand, License Suspension Statute in Child Support

179 Williamson v.

Cases Successful in Other States, GANNr=mT NEwS SERvicE, June 2, 1995.
181 For cases of license revocation statutes geared toward alcohol consumption by minors,
see People v. Valenzuela, 3 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 6 (1991); Carney v. State, 808 S.W.2d 755
(1991). In the context of failure to pay certain taxes, see Bieling v. Malloy, 346 A.2d 204
(1975).
182 535 N.E.2d 829 (1989).
183 Id. at 834.
184 Id. at 831.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 832.
188 Id.
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Focusing on the first prong of the test,'8 9 the state argued that the
court must consider not only the legislature's stated purpose but also any
"conceivable basis for the challenged provision," 190 including punishment of the offender. However, the court rejected this argument on two
grounds. First, the court had determined the purpose of the statute based
not only upon the legislature's stated purpose but also upon the context
of the statute and the surrounding code provisions - the Illinois Vehicle
Code. 19 1 Second, the court found the state's argument unreasonable and
stated that their duty to "uphold the constitutionality of legislative enactments is always subject to the qualification that we must do so if that can
be reasonablydone." 192 Although the court rejected the state's argument
that one purpose of the statute was punishment, the court considered it
arguendo.193 The court stated that even if punishment were one purpose
of the statute, revoking licenses is arbitrary and "bears no reasonable
relationship to the offense."' 194 Later Illinois case-law has expanded Linder to include license revocation for violation of controlled substance
statutes. 195

Similarly, the Court of Common Pleas of Ohio found that a law
providing for the revocation of drivers licenses of convicted drug traf196
fickers was an unconstitutional violation of substantive due process.
The court reasoned that, because the statute did not require the use of a
motor vehicle in the commission of the offense, license revocation did
not bear a reasonable relationship to the offense. 197 However, in the context of controlled substance violations, other states have held in favor of
license revocation statutes. For example, some state courts have generally concluded that the "unlawful sale and use of drugs constitutes a serious problem,"19 8 thereby establishing a reasonable state interest.1 99
Furthermore, some state courts have generally concluded that license
revocation may serve as a "deterrent to illegal drug distribution and use,
and as a means of rehabilitation." 20 0 Additionally, some state courts
189 The state had conceded "that if safety were the only purpose of the statute, the challenged provision bears no rational relationship to the statute's purpose and therefore revocation
of the defendant's license is unconstitutional." Id. at 832.
190 Id. at 833. See also Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
'9'

Id. at 832.

192 Id. at 833 (emphasis added). The court noted that Illinois law provides that "summary
suspension of a license before a trial on the merits is an administrative function and not a
punishment." Id.
193 Id. at 833-34.
194 Id. at 834.

195
196
197
198

People v. Lawrence, 565 N.E.2d 322 (II. App. Ct. 1990).
Ohio v. Gowdy, 639 N.E.2d 878 (1994).
Id. The Gowdy court was persuaded by the reasoning of Linder.
Rushworth v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 596 N.E.2d 340 (Mass. 1992).

199 Id.

200 Id. at 344.
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have suggested that license revocation, even for drug offenses not involving the use of a motor vehicle, may help prevent the incidence of driving
under the influence of narcotics and help prevent drug trafficking via
automobiles. 2 1 Consequently, these states have found that license revocation statutes for controlled substance violations which do not involve
the operation of a motor vehicle have a reasonable relationship to the
202
rational state interest of preventing the unlawful sale and use of drugs.
In the context of license revocation statutes for the purpose of child
support enforcement, the possibility exists that the state courts which interpret their constitution as providing a higher level of substantive due
process protection than the United States Constitution may strike down
these statutes. However, such a decision seems unlikely in light of the
strong state interest in increasing child support collections and protecting
the welfare of the children within the state. Many state supreme court
judges may be more sympathetic to attempts to decrease welfare expenditures and to increase child welfare than to attempts to increase individuals' due process protections.
c.

Do license revocation statutes create suspect classifications?

Equal protection arguments have repeatedly been raised in state
cases contesting statutory schemes that provide for the revocation of
drivers licenses. 20 3 Driving has not been held to be a fundamental right.
Consequently, in an attempt to avoid the application of the rational basis
test and bring the statute in question under heightened scrutiny, litigants
usually argue that a statute license revocation statute creates an impermissible statutory classification. 2° 4 However, such statutes seldom, if
ever, create classifications considered to be suspect such as ones based
on race or national origin. Nor do they implicate quasi-suspect classifications such as gender or illegitimacy.
For example, in cases involving the revocation of juveniles' drivers
licenses for violations of drug or alcohol statutes, litigants have argued
that such statutes violate equal protection by creating classifications
based on age. 2 05 But because age is not a suspect or quasi-suspect classi20 6
fication, courts have applied the rational basis test in such cases.
Under the rational basis test, state courts have held that legislative classi201 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 276 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971); Quiller v. Bowman, 425 S.E.2d
641 (Ga. 1993).
202 id.

203 See generally Jefferey T. Walter, Annotation, Validity and Application of Statute or
Regulation Authorizing Revocation or Suspension of Driver'sLicensefor Reason Unrelated to
Use of, orAbility to Operate, Motor Vehicle, 18 A.L.R.5th 542 (1994).
204 Id.

205 See, e.g., People v. Valenzuela, 3 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 6 (1991).
206 See, e.g., id.
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fications based on age are reasonably related to the rational state interest
of preventing consumption of alcohol and drugs by minors, as well as the
possibility of minors operating motor vehicles under the influence of al20 7
cohol or drugs.
Similarly, in cases involving license revocation for failure to pay
poll taxes, the Supreme Court of Vermont held that classifications based
upon those who pay their poll tax and those who do not pay does not
constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class. 208 Furthermore, revocation of
drivers licenses for failure to pay a poll tax does not infringe upon a
fundamental right for the purposes of equal protection of those who fail
to pay. 20 9 Consequently, such statutes have been subjected to the mere
2 10
rationality review and upheld by the Supreme Court of Vermont.
In the case of license revocation statutes for the purpose of child
support enforcement, a legislative classification will be created that distinguishes between those delinquent obligors who are licensed to operate
a motor vehicle and those who are not. Those obligors who do have
drivers licenses will be subject to license revocation. In contrast, those
delinquent obligors who are not licensed to drive clearly cannot have a
drivers license revoked. No parallel penalty is provided for unlicensed
delinquent obligors. A classification based upon one's status with regard
to state licensure to operate a motor vehicle clearly does not fall within a
traditional suspect classification. Such a classification would be subject
to the rational basis test. The Supreme Court has held that the collection
of child support obligations is an important state interest.2 11 Under the
rational basis test, the legislative means - license revocation - is rationally related to the legislative end - collection of delinquent child
support obligations. The deterrence generated by the threat of license
revocation bears a clear relationship to the goal of increased collections.
The fact that the deterrence will be lessened or eliminated altogether
among those delinquent obligors who are not licensed to drive does not
change the rational relationship between the means and ends for those
who are licensed to drive. Consequently, it is likely that these drivers
license revocation statutes would easily withstand an equal protection
claim based on a classification that distinguishes between obligors who
drive and those who do not drive.

207 People v. Valenzuela; State v. Preston, 832 P.2d 513 (1992); Washington v. Weese,
834 P.2d 1099 (1992); Washington v. Preston, 832 P.2d 513 (1992).
208 Beiling v. Malloy, 346 A.2d 204 (Vt. 1975). See also Aiken v. Malloy, 315 A.2d 488
(Vt. 1974).
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
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5.

Substantive Due Process and Equal ProtectionAnalysis of
Professional/OccupationalLicense Revocation

a.

Is there a fundamental right of livelihood?

There has been an increasing interest among some legal scholars in
reviving the doctrine of substantive due process in the context of economic rights. 2 12 Recently, Professor McCormack has argued in favor of
reviving the doctrine of substantive due process in the protection of what
he termed "the right of livelihood. 2 13 Professor McCormack argues that
the right of livelihood is an economic right worthy of substantive protections because in modem society one's livelihood "perform[s] many of
the social functions formerly served by property." 21 4 That is, the right to
choose one's livelihood promotes "maximum productivity," 2 15 serves to
protect "the fruits of one's labors," 2 16 and "encourage[s] the development of personality traits, or what Madison and Field called a person's
21 7
faculties."
If such an approach were adopted by the Court, the revocation of
professional licenses would clearly infringe upon the fundamental right
of livelihood, making the legislative scheme subject to a strict scrutiny
standard of review, which the statutes would be unlikely to survive.
However, the Court does not currently recognize a fundamental right of
livelihood, and has given no indication that it is heading in the direction
of establishing a fundamental right of livelihood for the purposes of substantive due process. 21 8 Additionally, state courts and federal district
courts have upheld professional license revocations for conduct unrelated
to the professional activity across a variety of contexts. For example,
219 and dental 220
state courts have upheld the revocation of medical
licenses for attempts to evade the income tax, the revocation of veterinary licenses for possession of controlled substances, 22 1 revocation of
medical licenses for unlawful firearm possession,2 22 and revocation of
212 Wayne McCormack, Economic Substantive Due Process and the Right of Livelihood,
82 Ky. L.J. 397 (1994).
213 Id. at 450.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 451.
216 Id.

217 Id. at 449 n.305.

218 Interestingly, Professor Charles Black has argued that the Court should recognize a
constitutional right to livelihood and should ground the right in the Ninth Amendment.
Charles C. Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86
CoLuM. L. REv. 1103 (1986).
219 Windham v. Board of Medical Quality Assur., 104 Cal. App. 3d 461 (1980).
220 Bills v. Weaver, 544 P.2d 690 (1976).
221 Thorpe v. Board of Examiners in Veterinary Medicine, 104 Cal. App. 3d 111 (1980).
222 Raymond v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 443 N.E.2d 391 (1982).
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real-estate brokers' licenses for bookmaking, 22 3 perjury, 22 4 and securities
offenses. 225 Often courts will reason that such offenses involve moral
turpitude bringing them within the scope of statutes providing for professional license revocation for acts involving moral turpitude. The commission of a felony, whether or not it involves moral turpitude, and
whether or not it is related to professional activities, is sufficiently related to the professional conduct to warrant license revocation or
suspension.
It appears that infringements upon one's right to livelihood will be
subject only to the mere rationality standard of review. 226 However, as
will be seen in the next section, the rational relationship test does retain
some bite in the context of the right to livelihood.
b. Is there a rational relationship between professional/
occupational licensure and child support enforcement?
Even if there is no fundamental right to livelihood, the question that
still remains is whether there is a rational relationship between professional/occupational licensure and child support enforcement. In some
situations, state statutes that interfere with the right to engage in one's
chosen occupation have failed the rational basis test. In Schware v.
Board,227 the Court held that state qualifications to practice law must
"have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity," and
that plaintiffs prior membership in the Communist Party did not have
such a rational connection. Similarly, in Hampton v. Vow Sun Wong, 22s
the Court struck down a Civil Service Commission rule barring aliens
from the civil service. The Court stated that the rule could be upheld
only if it was "justified by reasons which are properly the concern of the
CSC"22 9 because the right to work in the federal Civil Service is an "interest in liberty. ' 230
In the context of professional license revocation for the purpose of

child support enforcement, the primary state objective*is not regulation
of professions or occupations. Rather the state objective is to increase
support collections. If the state objective were to regulate professions
and occupations, it might appear to be a strained argument to suggest that
failure to pay child support is related to one's professional capacity.
However, courts have recognized that failure to pay child support may be
223 Carp v. Florida Real Estate Comm., 211 So. 2d 240 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968).

224
225
226
227
228

Application of O'Neill, 265 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1965).
Ring v. Smith, 5 Cal. App. 2d 197 (1970).
Thompson v. Ellenbecker, Civ. 94-4166 (D.S.D. filed Sept. 18, 1995).
353 U.S. 232 (1957).
426 U.S. 88 (1976).

229 Id.
230 Id.
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related to professional competency. In Flores v. Board of Psychologist
Examiners, the Arizona Superior Court held that "the failure of a professional to financially support his or her child clearly demonstrates ... a
lack of appropriate character and fitness of the subject professional." 23 1
Furthermore, because the state objective is to increase collections,
professional license revocation can be argued to bear a rational relationship to the legislative end through the deterrence created by threatening
license revocation. However, many opponents of professional license
revocation have argued that such statutes are actually counterproductive,
suggesting that professional or occupational license revocation will decrease the obligors earning capacity thereby further decreasing the likelihood that the obligor will be able to pay back support.232 This argument
fails in that most professional license revocation statutes provide a
lengthy notification period before the license is actually revoked; some
programs issue a temporary license and others offer the opportunity to
work out a payment plan. 233 This provides a system similar to civil contempt in which the obligor holds the key to the jailhouse door.234 In the
case of professional license revocation, the delinquent obligor has an adequate opportunity to comply with the court order for support before the
professional license is revoked, thereby avoiding any real threat of job
loss or temporary unemployment.
The establishment of a professional license revocation program is
rationally related to the state interest in increasing child support collections. The establishment of such programs will not contribute to increased unemployment and consequently decreased collections if such
programs provide sufficient advance notice of license revocation and/or
provide for temporary licenses during which time a delinquent obligor
may come into compliance with court orders.
c.

Do license revocation statutes create unconstitutional
classifications?

Professional and occupational license revocation statutes create a
legislative classification based upon an individual's type of employment.
A delinquent obligor employed in a position that requires licensure will
be affected by the revocation statutes and a delinquent obligor employed
in a position that does not require licensure will remain largely
unaffected.
231 Susan Nicholas, Note: Collecting Child Supportfrom Delinquent Parents:A Constitutional Analysis of an Arizona Enforcement Mechanism, 34 ARiz. L. REv. 163, 184 (citing

Flores, 1992).
232 Bruce Eden, New Child Support Laws Violate the Rights to Work and Travel, THE
CHILDREN'S ADVOCATE, Mar. 1993, at 6.
233 See Matrix, supra note 10.
234 DON B. DOBBS, DOBBS ON THE LAW OF REmEDIES 192 (2d ed. 1993).
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However, classifications based upon occupation have never been
held to be suspect or quasi-suspect classifications and do not hold the
traditional indicators of suspect classifications such as being an immutable characteristic. 3 5 Such classifications are likely to be subject only to
a rational basis standard of review.23 6 The classifications are likely to be
upheld under a rational basis standard because the state interest in increasing support collections is rationally related to license revocation
237
through the deterrent effect created by the threat of license revocation.
Furthermore, the non-wage earners are beyond the reach of many of the
traditional enforcement mechanisms such as garnishment and wage
withholding. 23 s
Consequently, the establishment of professional license revocation
programs brings that group of non-wage earners within the reach of the
child support enforcement mechanism, thereby establishing i financial
penalty for both wage earners and self-employed professionals. This inclusion of self-employed professionals adds to the legitimacy of child
support enforcement programs by extinguishing the perception that certain groups are beyond the reach of government enforcement. Furthermore, the inclusion of self-employed professionals through license
revocation statutes will increase overall collections. 23 9 These justifications for professional and occupational license revocation statutes
strengthen the rational link between the state's means and ends. Classifications created by professional and occupational license revocation are,
therefore, likely to be upheld under a rational basis standard.
One final concern in an equal protection analysis is the fact that
many state license revocation statutes apply to almost all licensed professionals except for attorneys. This is because in many states attorney discipline is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the state supreme court,
whereas the discipline of all other professional groups is subject to regulation by the state legislature.2 0 Consequently, writing lawyers out of
professional license revocation statutes creates a legislative classification
that initially appears to be based upon an arbitrary distinction between
types of professions, but is in fact a jurisdictional requirement. However,
state supreme courts can easily remedy any inequality of treatment. For
example, in Florida the state legislature recently adopted a professional
license revocation statute. 24 1 Because attorney discipline was under the
235
236
237
238
239
240
241

at 8-9.

TRIBE, supra note 96 § 16-13, at 1465.
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 88 at

§ 14.3, at 601.
See infra note 247.
See supra note 13.
See supra note 13.
See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Taylor, 648 So. 2d 709 (1995).
FLA. STAT. ch. 61.13015 (1995). See also License Revocation Matrix, supra note 10,
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exclusive jurisdiction of the Florida State Supreme Court, attorney's
were not covered by the statute. 24 2 Consequently, the Florida Legislature
requested that the Supreme Court amend its disciplinary rules to bring
them in line with the new state statute. 24 3 Recognizing the importance of
child support enforcement and the need for equal treatment, the Florida
Supreme Court initiated a proposed new rule to address failure to pay
child support. 2 4 The adoption by state supreme courts of analogous
rules governing attorneys should eliminate any equal protection claims
by "maintain[ing] consistency between the treatment of attorneys who
fail to pay child support and the treatment of other professional who like245
wise fail to pay child support."
IV.

ANALYSIS OF EXISTING STATUTORY SCHEMES AND
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Since 1990, most states have enacted legislation authorizing license
restrictions as a method of child support enforcement. 246 The greatest
flurry of legislative activity in this area has occurred over the past year or
so, in part spurred on by publicity and success reported by states who
entered this arena early. 24 7 The legislative schemes enacted vary considerably in terms of the types of licenses covered, the criteria used to trigger enforcement, and the availability and scope of administrative and
judicial review. 248 Variations along any of these dimensions may have
important legal and policy implications.
A.

LICENSES AFFECTED

Most states with license revocation laws on the books cover both
motor vehicle and professional/occupational licenses. 24 9 From a legal
standpoint, the types of licenses covered may have both due process and
equal protection implications. Under federal constitutional standards of
242 See Florida Bar v. Tayor, 648 So. 2d 709 (1995).
243 Id. at 711.
244 In re Rules Regulating the Florida Bar - Willful Nonpayment of Child Support, No.

84,390 (Fla. Nov. 3, 1994). Other state supreme courts have taken similar approaches. See,
e.g., Donald R. Lundberg, Supreme Court Makes Major Changes to Lawyer Discipline Rules,

39 REs GasrAE 6 (1996).
245 Florida Bar v. Taylor, 648 So. 2d 709, 711 (1995).
246 License Revocation Matrix, supra note 10.

247 For example, in an article entitled "Maine Says: Support Your Kids or Walk;" Boston
Globe Columnist Ellen Goodman reported that between August 1993 and June 1994, Maine's
license revocation program was responsible for the collection of $12.9 million "before the first
license had been taken away." OMAHA WORLD HERALD,July 29, 1994. See also supra note 8.

248 See License Revocation Matrix, supra note 10.
249 Id. In fact, under the Welfare Reform Act, states are now required to cover both motor
vehicle and professional/occupational licenses as well as sport and recreation licenses. Welfare Reform Act, supra note 9.
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substantive due process, the requirement that a rational relationship exist
between the revocation of either motor vehicle or professional licenses
and child support enforcement would most likely be satisfied. However,
as noted above, some state courts may be more willing than federal
courts to strike down a license revocation law, particularly when the law
provides for the revocation of a motor vehicle license for conduct unrelated to the operation of a motor vehicle. 250 This reflects the possibility
that it may be more difficult, at least on the surface, to establish a plausible, rational link between child support enforcement and the revocation
of a driver's as compared to a professional license. Thus, state courts
uncomfortable with increased government involvement in family matters
and personal life may be more inclined to draw the line at the revocation
of motor vehicle licenses. As a result, they might be more likely to strike
down such programs by holding that the nexus between the driving privilege and child support enforcement is insufficient. Again, though, it
must be emphasized that this position is likely to be endorsed by only a
few, if any, state courts; the majority of state courts will continue to
interpret their state constitutional provisions in a manner that closely
tracks the interpretation of parallel federal constitutional provisions. 5 1
Programs that cover professional licenses may be vulnerable for
other reasons. First, some state courts may be persuaded by the argument that the revocation of a professional license infringes on a fundamental right to livelihood.25 2 Although this argument is unlikely to be
embraced by many courts, 25 3 those that do accept this line of reasoning
will apply strict scrutiny analysis, which almost always results in the
scrutinized statutory scheme being held unconstitutional. Although a
strong argument can be made that the state has a compelling interest in
child support enforcement, the second narrow-tailoring prong of the strict
scrutiny test is more difficult to satisfy. Failure to meet the narrow-tailoring requirement would most likely serve as the basis for striking down
a license revocation law based on strict scrutiny analysis.
One approach to narrowing the scope of the license revocation program is to clearly spell out in the statute that this remedy will be pursued
only after efforts to collect child support through other means (such as
See discussion supra section llI.B.3.
See discussion supra section II.B.3.
252 See discussion supra section IHI.B.5.a.
253 It would seem that conservative courts might be sympathetic to the notion of a fundamental right to livelihood as a shield against government intrusion into an individual's right to
earn a living in a chosen profession. However, those same courts are likely to be even more
concerned about the ideological and economic implications of constitutionalizing a right to
livelihood. Going down this path may ultimately increase the likelihood that implied, affirmative obligations will be imposed on the government to protect a fundamental right to livelihood. See Black, supra note 218, at 1103.
250
251
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income-withholding) have failed. This more narrow tailoring of the statutory scheme may increase its chances of surviving strict scrutiny analysis, particularly in state courts inclined to use a more yielding approach
to strict scrutiny analysis. Nonetheless, it must be emphasized that most
courts will not consider the right to livelihood to be fundamental and will
therefore use the rational basis test, which means that a license revocation statute will almost certainly survive constitutional challenge on this
basis.
Equal protection issues also may arise in the context of professional
license revocation. Professionals may argue that they are being singled
out and treated differently from those who do not have professional
licenses. Additionally, several state programs that target professional
licenses exclude licenses to practice law for reasons noted above.25 4 As
a result, other professionals facing license revocation for child support
enforcement purposes may argue that they are not receiving required
equal protection of the laws because lawyers are unfairly singled out for
special or different treatment.
As our review of equal protection analysis reveals, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the states from denying any person within their
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. In cases that do not involve
a fundamental right or a suspect classification such as race or national
origin, a rational basis test very similar to the one used in substantive due
process analysis applies. This means that a legislative classification must
have a legitimate legislative objective and the classification must bear a
rational relation between that objective and the means toward that
objective.
Thus, if people with professional licenses assert that they are treated
differently and unfairly in comparison to those without such licenses, it
can be argued that license holders are targeted because the state has a
legitimate objective in trying to collect child support from non-wage
earners and the self employed. Likewise, if it is necessary to treat attorneys differently from other professionals because attorney discipline is
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Supreme Court, it can be
argued that this difference in treatment is reasonable because attorneys
are regulated differently than are other professionals (i.e., by the State
Supreme Court rather than legislative authority). Thus, treating them differently (e.g., referring them to the Court designated authority over attorney discipline rather than subjecting them to statutory revocation) is
rationally related to the legitimate objective of collecting support from
both attorneys and other professionals in a way that will not infringe on
the State Supreme Court's authority over attorney discipline.
254 See discussion supra section III.B.5.c.
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As noted above, courts will sometimes use an intermediate level of
scrutiny when semi-suspect classifications such as gender or illegitimacy
are used. 2 5- However, neither gender nor illegitimacy appear to be directly relevant to any legislative classifications created under license revocation programs.
Perhaps the most important implications of the type of licenses covered are in the realm of public policy. Obviously, almost everyone has a
driver's license; 25 6 this is not the case for professional or occupational
licenses. In fact, most people who have a professional/occupational license also have a driver's license, whereas the opposite is not true. Thus,
any license revocation program aimed at maximizing the amount of child
support collected would need to target driver's licenses to reach the maximum number of individuals who owe child support. However, there are
important policy reasons for targeting professional as well as motor vehicle licenses. Although most professionals would already be subject to
enforcement under a motor vehicle license revocation program, specifically targeting professionals may expedite enforcement against deadbeat
parents who are quite able but unwilling to pay. The threat of loss of a
professional license may be particularly salient to this group. Moreover,
targeting professional as well as driver's licenses may contribute to overall public perceptions of the fairness of the legislative scheme. 25 7
Targeting professional licenses demonstrates the seriousness of the problem and signals the government's resolve to go after more affluent as
well as less well-off parents who owe child support. 258

B.

TRIGGER CRrEmRIA

State license revocation programs vary in terms of the criteria that
must be triggered before a person is subject to license revocation for
purposes of child support enforcement. Some jurisdictions have durational requirements (ranging from a one month25 9 to a one year 2 60 child
support delinquency), others have amount requirements (ranging from
any arrearage 261 to a $2500262 arrearage), and some require a court order
255 See discussion supra section II.B.2.
256 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
257 See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY TmE LAw (1990).

258 Mark R. Fondacaro & Andrew J. Slain, Child Support Enforcement Against Noncustodial Parents: Does it Make a Difference Whether They are Deadbeats or Destitute? Paper
presented at the 1995 Fifth Biennial Conference on Community Research and Action, Chicago, Illinois.
259 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §§ 795, 798. See also License Revocation Matrix, supra
note 10, at 35 (State of Vermont).
260 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 186.570. See also License Revocation Matrix, supra note 10,
at 18 (State of Kentucky).
261 License Revocation Matrix, supra note 10, at 32 (Puerto Rico).
262 Id. at 23 (State of Oregon).
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of contempt 263 before a delinquent obligor is subject to license revocation. This later requirement has important implications for program
administration.
Requiring a court order of contempt to initiate the license revocation
process severely restricts the number of delinquent obligors who may be
persuaded to comply with their child support obligation rather than face
the threat of losing a driver's or professional license. Results reported by
highly successful license revocation programs in states such as Maine
indicate that the mere threat of license revocation has generated tens of
millions of dollars of child support collections. 26 This is true because
warning letters can be sent to thousands of delinquent obligors, informing them that they are subject to license revocation if they do not comply
with statutory requirements. The warning letters may also state that the
obligor can avoid further action by voluntarily complying with their support order or working out a payment plan where available and appropriate. The bulk of program administration and enforcement is
accomplished without judicial involvement. On the other hand, requiring
court orders before the license revocation process can be initiated means
that only a limited number of cases can be handled at any one time,
which, in turn, means much less delinquent child support can be
collected.

C.

AVAILABILITY AND SCOPE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL
REVIEw

Procedural due process requires that before the government can deprive a person of liberty or property the person must be afforded notice
and an opportunity to be heard. If an adequate notice and an adequate
hearing is provided, then the constitutional requirements of procedural
due process are met. Adequate notice "is notice reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to appraise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." 265 Thus, in order to easily survive constitutional challenge, notice
can be provided to delinquent obligors by certified mail informing them
of the following: that they are subject to license revocation, the basis for
the potential action against them, and what they can do to avoid license
revocation.
Ample opportunity to be heard should be provided through both administrative review and the opportunity for judicial review. Hearings
should be provided before licenses are revoked or suspended in order to
263 ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-3701, 12-2452. See also License Revocation Matrix,
supra note 10, at 10 (State of Arizona).
264 Supra note 1.
265 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
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ensure that constitutional requirements of procedural due process are
met. One critical issue with both legal and policy implications is
whether such predeprivation hearings should be administrative, judicial,
or involve some combination of the two. A second issue is whether
postdeprivation review is required as a matter of law or at least desirable
as a matter of public policy.
Clearly, a predeprivation administrative fair hearing followed by
postdeprivation judicial review would more than satisfy minimal constitutional requirements in this context. As was evidenced in Bell,
Goldberg, and Mathews, predeprivation judicial review is not a constitutional requirement. 266 With regard to the predeprivation phase of a license revocation program, an administrative fair hearing that allowed
individuals "to make a meaningful presentation" 267 of their case would
clearly suffice as a matter of constitutional law. But what about as a
matter of public policy? Here, the government's interest in administrative efficiency must be balanced against individual and public perceptions that justice has been done. 268 On the one hand, delinquent obligors
facing license revocation may believe that they are getting second class
justice if their licenses are revoked without the opportunity to tell their
side of the story in a court of law. On the other hand, from the standpoint of efficiency, predeprivation judicial review could be highly costly,
time consuming, and lead to decreased child support collections. Moreover, in terms of overall public perceptions, the public at large may not
be inclined to demand much more than minimum constitutional due process safeguards given the current climate of hostility toward parents who
269
do not pay their fair share of child support.
Thus, predeprivation hearings conducted administratively rather
than by the courts are legally permissible and would seem on balance to
be desirable from a public policy standpoint. However, existing license
revocation schemes, such as the one used in Maine, 2 70 tend to err on the
side of caution by providing at least some opportunity for judicial review
prior to license revocation. This is done presumably to reduce the possibility of successful constitutional challenge on procedural due process
grounds.
This approach raises the question of whether an opportunity for
predeprivation judicial review imposes undue impediments to efficient
266 See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMmSTRA-vE LAw

(1993).

§ 12.5.2

Waiters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 335 (1985).
See ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
Obviously, these are empirical questions that could be addressed by systematic social
science research.
270 19 M.R.S. § 305 (1994) (occupational licenses); 19 M.R.S. § 306 (1994) (driver's
licenses).
267
268
269
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program administration. At least in the short run, it appears that providing an opportunity for predeprivation judicial review has a negligible effect on program efficiency. This is due to the fact that the success of
license revocation programs such as Maine's appear to rest more on the
mere threat of license revocation than the number of license actually revoked. However, over time, if actual license revocation is not pursued
aggressively, "the perceived threat may decrease along with collections"
directly attributable to the license revocation program. 27 1
Although there may be no constitutional right to predeprivation judicial review, that does not mean as a matter of policy that it would not
be desirable, at least in the short run, to allow for predeprivation judicial
review under certain circumstances. Most of the push toward administrative process has been encouraged by the federal government. This has
been in response to the increased claims for federal benefits and services.
States have been much slower in adopting a more systemic view of due
process; most are still anchored in a case-by-case judicial model of due
process. This orientation also is likely to be deeply entrenched in the
thinking of many practicing attorneys, particularly those who were
trained before the modem push toward greater emphasis on administrative process or whose legal practices have focused on state rather than
federal law. In any case, in those states where the bench, bar, and legislature are characterized by a traditional view of due process, it may be
easier to get support of a license revocation bill that provides for some
form of predeprivation judicial review. In fact, in some states, this may
be necessary for the survival of the bill. As suggested, a major draw
back is that allowing for predeprivation judicial review may ultimately
over-burden the judicial system and lead to less efficient enforcement of
the license revocation laws.
D.

JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE ENFORCEMENT PROCESS

Although the federal government has strongly encouraged the use of
administrative procedures to implement and enforce child support laws,
states vary considerably in the extent to which the judicial system is integral to program administration. A distinction must be made here between judicial review of the procedures followed in decisionmaking on
the one hand, and the requirement that the judiciary be involved in intermediate steps of program administration or in making the ultimate determination of whether a license should be revoked.
For example, Arizona relies heavily on judicial involvement in its
professional/occupational license revocation program. The enforcement
271 GOVERNOR'S CHILD SUPPORT STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT TO GOVERNOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON AND THE NEBRAsKA LEGISLATURE, Appendix E, at 6 (1994).
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process begins with a petition to enforce overdue child support filed with
the superior court. If a judicial determination is made that the obligor is
"at least one month in arrears and is or may be licensed or certified as a
professional .... the court... may direct the licensing board or agency
to conduct a hearing . . . concerning the suspension of the license or
certificate of the person ordered to pay support. '272 In contrast, in
Minnesota an initial determination of whether an obligor is in arrears in
child support may be made by either the court or by a public authority
responsible for child support enforcement. 273 If either the court or the
public authority find that an obligor is in arrears and is or may be licensed by a state licensing board, the court or the public authority may
direct the licensing board to automatically suspend the license. 274
Although the Arizona and Minnesota plans differ in the degree to which
judicial involvement is required before a license may be revoked, both
plans attempt to meet minimum due process requirements by providing
27 5
notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to license revocation.
There are both legal and policy justifications for providing some
form of terminal judicial review of the license revocation decisionmaking process. From a legal standpoint, the prospects of withstanding constitutional challenge would be decreased if there were no opportunity for
at least some judicial oversight of the decisionmaking process. 276 From

a policy standpoint, one important justification for having some form of
terminal, post-deprivation judicial review is that such procedures are
likely to contribute to public perceptions of the fairness of the license
revocation program. As mentioned above, in some states it may be necessary to go further and to allow for pre- rather than post-deprivation
272 ARIz. REv. STAT.

ANN.§ 12-2452 (1995).

273 MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 518.551(12) (1994).

Id.
Although Arizona and Minnesota differ in the degree of judicial involvement necessary to trigger the initial license revocation, both plans provide for notice and hearing. In
Arizona, upon filing of the petition with the superior court, the court will serve an order to
appear before the court and a copy of the petition as provided in the Arizona rules of civil
procedure. ARiZ. REV.STAT. ANN. § 12-2452(C) (1995). Furthermore, if the court finds the
obligor is in arrears and directs a licensing agency to conduct a hearing, within thirty days of
receipt of the court order the licensing agency must "provide notice to the licensee or certificate holder and hold a hearing to determine if the person is licensed by the board." Id. § 323701(A). Similarly, a Minnesota court must provide an obligor with notice of a hearing as
provided by the Minnesota rules of civil procedure. If Minnesota public authority determines
that an obligor is in arrears, the public authority is required to "mail a written notice to the
license holder... that the public authority intends to seek license suspension." MnJN. STAT.
ANN.§ 518.551(12) (1994). Such notice must be sent "at least 90 days before notifying the
licensing authority." Id. Furthermore, such notice must provide that "the license holder must
request a hearing within 30 days in order to contest the suspension." Id.
276 NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 88 § 13.10; AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 266
274
275

§ 12.5.2.
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judicial review in order to garner the public and political support neces2 77
sary for the adoption of a license revocation program.
The advocacy of at least terminal, post-deprivation judicial review
of the decision making process in no way reflects an endorsement of
involving the judiciary in case-by-case pre-deprivation determinations of
whether particular licenses should be revoked. To do so would severely
restrict the number of cases that could be processed, overburden judicial
resources, and limit the amount of child support that could be collected
on behalf of needy families and taxpayers.
V.

CONCLUSION

The increased divorce rate and the increasing number of single parent families living below the poverty line have catapulted child support
enforcement to the status of a critical social problem of national significance. Legislators at both the state and federal levels have responded to
the public outcry against "deadbeat parents" who fail to pay their fair
share of child support by adopting new, more aggressive enforcement
strategies. One promising strategy is the establishment of motor vehicle
and professional license revocation programs. Although license revocation is considered by some to be overly harsh, every state implementing a
license revocation statute has seen a marked increase in child support
collections. Increased collections means more money going to the children of single parents, which, in turn, may mean that fewer single parent
families will require public financial assistance. However, the constitutional rights of parents who owe child support must also be given due
consideration.
License revocation statutes could conceivably be challenged on procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection
grounds. Several such challenges already have been brought in state and
federal courts, and more challenges are expected elsewhere. However,
277 Even those states opting for pre-deprivation judicial review need not require their
courts to engage in case-by-case de novo review of factual determinations. Courts apply various standards of review, depending on the nature of the issue examined. The scope of review

"determines how far a court can go in overturning or remanding an agency decision." AMAN
& MAY'rON, supra note 266 § 13.2. Courts typically use the substantial evidence test to re-

view agency fact finding in on-the-record hearings. Under this test, if substantial evidence in
the record supports the agency's finding, a court will affirm that finding even if the court
would not have made the same decision on its own. Id. § 13.4; Fondacaro, supra note 33, at
322-23. A specific standard of judicial review such as the substantial evidence test may be
explicitly authorized by statute and already may be the standard of judicial review of agency
factfinding established under the state's Administrative Procedure Act. In any event, states
that do elect to adopt a legislative scheme that allows for some pre-deprivation judicial review
can avoid involving their courts in making or second guessing case-by-case factual determinations by adopting the substantial evidence test as the standard of judicial review of factual
matters.
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such constitutional challenges will not pose a serious threat to a well
drafted license revocation statute. Both state and federal courts are unlikely to be persuaded that license revocation statutes infringe upon fundamental rights. Furthermore, courts are likely to recognize that child
support enforcement is an important state interest and that license revocation statutes are reasonably related to achieving that important state
interest. In sum, it is likely that existing license revocation statutes will
consistently survive constitutional attack and that all fifty states will ultimately implement license restriction schemes to enforce child support
obligations.

